Tracking Trump Administration Legal Challenges

Jonathan J. Rusch

Since President Trump’s 2025 inauguration, the welter of Executive Orders, Proclamations, departmental directives and policies, and enforcement activities to further the President’s sweeping agenda, and the numerous civil actions that numerous parties have filed to challenge the Administration’s actions, can be overwhelming for researchers, writers, and lawyers to follow.  Fortunately, a number of news organizations, online publications, law firms, and public-interest groups have created and are regularly updating litigation trackers involving challenges to Trump Administration actions.

The following list includes some of the most complete and thorough compilations of litigation challenges to the Trump Administration:

Finally, American University Washington College of Law’s Pence Law Library has compiled a webpage, Resources Addressing Trump Executive Orders, that lists general and subject-specific litigation trackers, including some of the litigation trackers listed above.

Is Main Justice Obstructing Justice?

Jonathan J. Rusch

Over the past nine days, the ongoing drama of the U.S. Department of Justice’s efforts to dismiss the pending criminal corruption-related prosecution of New York City Mayor Eric Adams has attracted extensive national and even international attention.  In brief, those efforts included, in rapid succession –

  • A February 10 directive from Acting Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove to then-United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Danielle Sassoon, directing that she dismiss the case without prejudice on two bases: (1) that “the timing of the charges and more recent public actions by the former U.S. Attorney responsible for initiating the case [Damian Williams] have threatened the integrity of the proceedings, including by increasing prejudicial pretrial publicity that risks impacting potential witnesses and the jury pool”; and (2) that the prosecution “has unduly restricted Mayor Adams’ ability to devote full attention and resources to the illegal immigration and violent crime that escalated under the prior Administration”;
  • Sassoon’s February 12 response to Attorney General Pam Bondi, in which Sassoon opposed the demand on multiple grounds, stated that her office has “proposed a superseding indictment that would add an obstruction conspiracy count based on evidence that Adams destroyed and instructed others to destroy evidence and provide false information to the FBI”, and offered her provisional resignation;
  • Bove’s February 13 reply letter to Sassoon, in which he accepted her resignation, transferred the case to the Justice Department’s Public Integrity Section, placed the Assistant United States Attorneys principally responsible for the case on “off-duty, administrative leave” pending investigations by the Attorney General’s Office and the Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) (which investigates alleged prosecutorial misconduct), informed her that both of those offices “will also evaluate your conduct”, accused her of “pursuing a politically motivated prosecution” and “insubordination”, and added the ipse dixit that the prosecution rendered Mayor Adams “unable to communicate directly and candidly with City officials he is responsible for managing, as well as federal agencies trying to protect the public from national security threats and violent crime”;
  • The resignation of multiple experienced federal prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the Public Integrity Section in the face of Acting Deputy Attorney General Bove’s demands that the motion be filed; and
  • Acting Deputy Attorney General Bove’s and other Department attorneys’ February 14 signing of the motion to dismiss, after Bove made clear to Public Integrity Section prosecutors that they could be fired if they were unwilling to file the dismissal motion.

The motion to dismiss is now pending before U.S. District Judge Dale Ho in the Southern District. As a rule, federal judges generally have limited bases on which to deny a government motion to dismiss a criminal case.  The Department’s extraordinary and unprecedented conduct with regard to the Mayor Adams prosecution, however, raises substantial questions about whether that motion should be granted.

Various commentaries on the Department’s actions to date have criticized them as unprincipled and unethical, and even creating a “civil war” between the Department’s political leadership and career prosecutors.  But the publicly available information about the case prompts a much more substantial question: whether one or more senior officials at Justice Department headquarters (“Main Justice”, to Justice Department veterans) have been engaging in at least an endeavor to obstruct justice, if not an actual obstruction of justice, and thereby committing a federal crime.

To understand why this may be the case, it is necessary to review the general federal obstruction-of-justice offense and its essential elements.  Section 1503 of Title 18 in the United States Code prohibits, among other actions, anyone “corruptly or by threats or force . . . influenc[ing], obstruct[ing], or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice.”  In addition, the general conspiracy offense, section 371 of Title 18, covers conspiracies to violate section 1503.

A plenitude of judicial decisions broadly defines the scope of this “omnibus clause” in section 1503.  This language “is designed, in part, to prevent a miscarriage of justice in a case pending in a federal court” (United States v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1970)).  Accordingly, the offense “is all-embracing and designed to meet any corrupt conduct in an endeavor to obstruct or interfere with the due administration of justice” (United States v. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. 587, 588 (D. Conn. 1962), quoting United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812, 814 (S.D.N.Y.1956)).

Moreover, the breadth of section 1503’s omnibus clause extends to a wide range of acts.  As the law in the Second Circuit makes clear, these include not only false statements made directly to a federal court, but also concealment of information from a court that is relevant or germane to the court’s functions (see United States v.  Cohn, 452 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 975 (1972) and United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 112-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (conspiracy to violate §1503)).

As noted above, section 1503 extends not only to actual obstruction of justice but to any “endeavor” to do so.  The term “endeavor” “describes any effort or essay to do or accomplish the evil purpose that the section was enacted to prevent” (United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138, 143  (1921) (predecessor version of section 1503)).

Finally, a section 1503 offense requires proof that the person in question acted “corruptly.”  The term “corruptly” can simply mean “having an evil or improper purpose or intent” (see United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 114 n. 229 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 and 935 (1977)), which the Supreme Court indicated includes “knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding” (see United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995)).

In light of these essential elements, several related sets of facts warrant consideration:

  • Appearance of Coercion of a Criminal Defendant: Main Justice has moved for dismissal of a federal criminal prosecution without prejudice, while leaving open the possibility of reinstating those charges at any time.  Based on the available public information, the only logical explanation for filing for dismissal without prejudice, as opposed to dismissal with prejudice, is to maintain a continuing threat of a renewed prosecution over Mayor Adams, to ensure that he provides continuing support for the Administration’s immigration enforcement campaign.  That the Administration intends that specific objective is reflected not only in the Acting Deputy Attorney General’s memorandum and letter and the motion to dismiss, but by the statement of Tom Homan, the President’s “border czar”, that “If he [Mayor Adams] doesn’t come through,” “I’ll be back in New York City and we won’t be sitting on the couch. I’ll be in his office, up his butt saying, ‘Where the hell is the agreement we came to?'”
  • Violation of Department Policy: Section 9-27.260 of the Department’s Principles of Federal Prosecution, which addresses impermissible considerations for initiating or declining federal criminal charges, explicitly states: “[F]ederal prosecutors and agents may never make a decision regarding an investigation or prosecution, or select the timing of investigative steps or criminal charges, for the purpose of affecting any election, or for the purpose of giving an advantage or disadvantage to any candidate or political party.” (Emphasis supplied)  The motion to dismiss, which Acting Deputy Attorney General Bove signed, asserts “that dismissal is necessary because of appearances of impropriety and risks of interference with the 2025 elections in New York City.”  As Sassoon’s letter pointed out, the Adams indictment was unsealed in September 2024, some nine months before the June 2025 primary election.  If anything, the dismissal of the indictment, even if without prejudice, in February 2025 would almost certainly give Mayor Adams a greater advantage in the June primary election and the subsequent general election.
  • Proffering Misleading Explanation for Need for Dismissal: The government’s motion broadly asserts that dismissal without prejudice is necessary in part because of “appearances of impropriety”, citing, “among other [otherwise unspecified] things”, review of a website and a single blog post by former U.S. Attorney Willliams.  Experienced federal prosecutors, such as the Acting Deputy Attorney General, know that the government has several well-established options short of dismissal to address a defendant’s claims of prejudicial pretrial publicity.  Those include changes of venue under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, continuance at the government’s or the defendant’s request, and careful questioning of prospective jurors under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to identify possible influences from case-related publicity.  Any or all of those options would be more than adequate to address the government’s expressed concerns about pretrial publicity.  To date, Acting Deputy Attorney General Bove has offered no explanation of why these options would be insufficient to address concerns about pretrial publicity.
  • Contradictory Statements by Acting Deputy Attorney General About Integrity of Prosecutors: In his February 10 directive, Acting Deputy Attorney General Bove took pains to stress that his directive “in no way calls into question the integrity and efforts of the line prosecutors responsible for the case, or your efforts in leading those prosecutors in connection with a matter you inherited.”  Only three days later, in his February 13 letter to Sassoon, he accused Sassoon of “insubordination”, characterized the prosecution as “politically motivated”, threatened her and the prosecutors principally responsible for the case with investigation by the Attorney General’s Office and OPR, and added the ambiguous but ominous statement that at the conclusion of those investigations the Attorney General will determine whether termination or some other action is appropriate.” (Emphasis supplied)

Judge Ho has now scheduled a hearing for February 19 concerning the motion to dismiss.  In setting the hearing date, Judge Ho ordered that the parties “shall be prepared to address, inter alia, the reasons for the Government’s motion, the scope and effect of Mayor Adams’s “consent[] [to the motion] in writing,” ECF No. 122 at 1, and the procedure for resolution of the motion.”

Although the government and Mayor Adams agree that dismissal without prejudice is warranted, the attorneys who will appear at that hearing may find themselves on the horns of a dilemma.  To be completely truthful about the Administration’s actual motive for moving to dismiss without prejudice – as Rule 3.3 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct would require – risks undermining Main Justice’s professions of concern about “the integrity of the proceedings” and Mayor Adams’s ability to do his job.  But any misstatement or concealment of facts relevant to the court’s consideration of the motion can only raise further questions about the relevance of section 1503 to the case.

Hong Kong Court Imposes Heaviest-Ever Prison Sentences for Market Manipulation

Jonathan J. Rusch

Since 2003, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) has had the authority, under sections 245, 278, and 299 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Ordinance), to address a broad range of market misconduct, including market manipulation.  The maximum criminal penalties for committing market manipulation, under section 303 of the Ordinance, are 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of HKD$10 million.

While market manipulation has long been an enforcement priority for the SFC, the SFC has noted with concern what it termed “a recent increase in apparent market manipulative activities, in particular the rising number of suspected ramp and dump scams” (generally called “pump and dump schemes” in the United States).  Such scams typically involve fraudulent efforts by perpetrators to induce unsuspecting investors to make immediate purchases of a stock based on false or fraudulent information, rapidly driving up the price of that stock, followed quickly by the perpetrators’ rapid selloff of their own shares in that company before other purchasers recognize that the information on which they relied was false or fraudulent.  The SFC specifically deemed “ramp and dump scams” “a top enforcement priority.”

On July 22, the SFC achieved its greatest success in pursuing ramp and dump schemes, announcing that the Hong Kong Court of First Instance sentenced three individuals, convicted after a 22-day trial, to prison sentences between 52 and 80 months for
their roles in manipulating the shares of Ching Lee Holdings Limited, a leading Hong Kong firm.  The SFC termed it “the heaviest jail sentence imposed on market manipulation cases” since the Ordinance came into effect.

The SFC also reported that the sentencing judge in that case “remarked that the conspiracy in the present case was intricately and meticulously planned.”  The judge took into account “the scale, sophistication and international element of the conspiracy and the false trading, as well as the importance of maintaining the integrity of Hong Kong as
an international financial centre” in concluding “that deterrence and punishment are most important in this case.”  During the scheme, which lasted more than five months in 2016, the participants conducted manipulative transactions among 156 securities accounts under their control and garnered illicit profits of more than HKD$124 million.

In addition to the criminal prosecution, which the Hong Kong Department of Justice conducted, the SFC stated that it is seeking orders under section 213 of the Ordinance “against various local and overseas corporations and individuals, including the three jailed, to disgorge their profits in the manipulative scheme involving Ching Lee shares
and/or restore the affected counterparties to their pre-transaction positions.”

This case is noteworthy not only for the lengths of the sentences imposed, but also for the amount of international cooperation associated with the SFC investigation.  The SFC specifically thanked the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Ontario Securities Commission, the Singapore Police Force, the United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for their assistance.  Since ramp and dump schemes can be conducted from anywhere through social media or messaging apps, such international cooperation is likely to be critical in future SFC investigations.

SecurityScorecard Reports on Software Supply Chain Attacks on Energy Companies

Jonathan J. Rusch

In 2019-2020, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service successfully mounted what the U.S. General Accountability Office called “one of the most widespread and sophisticated hacking campaigns ever conducted against the federal government and private sector.”  Since then, cybersecurity experts have repeatedly called attention to the risks of software supply chain attacks.  Despite these warnings, companies have continued to fail to learn from the SolarWinds attack and fall victim to such attacks.  In 2022, for example, supply chain cyber attacks in the United States alone reportedly affected 1,743 entities — the highest reported number since 2017.

The threat of software supply chain attacks, however, is by no means limited to the United States.  A December 6 report by security resilience vendor SecurityScorecard stated that 90 percent of the world’s 48 largest energy companies have suffered a supply chain data breach in the past 12 months.  For this report, SecurityScorecard analyzed the cybersecurity profiles of the 48 largest energy companies in the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. The companies included the coal, oil, natural gas, and electricity sectors.  In total, SecurityScorecard examined more than 21,000 domains, and its analysis included both their third-party and fourth-party vendors.

Specific findings in the report included the following:

  • 100 percent of the top 10 U.S. energy companies experienced a third-party breach.
  • 92 percent of the energy companies evaluated have been exposed to a fourth-party breach.
  • 33 percent of energy companies had a C Security Rating or below, indicating a higher likelihood of breach.
  • In the last 90 days, SecurityScorecard identified 264 breach incidents related to third-party compromises.
  • MOVEit was the most prevalent third-party vulnerability in the last six months, with hundreds of companies affected around the world.

While this report examined only energy companies, it should serve to remind companies in all industries, including other aspects of critical infrastructure, that supply chain risk is a serious and continuing threat that requires immediate attention. Moreover, recent developments show that inadequate attention to software supply chain risks may pose not only operational and reputational risks, but legal risks as well.  On October 31, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced that it had charged both SolarWinds and its chief information security officer, Timothy G. Brown, with fraud and internal-control failures relating to allegedly known cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities.  Because the SEC’s jurisdiction extends not only to U.S. companies but to foreign companies whose shares are traded on U.S. securities exchanges, those companies need to make software supply chain risks a key priority in their cybersecurity programs.

Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority Establishes New Bank-Oriented Program on Online Fraud

Jonathan J. Rusch

One of the oddly persistent myths about online fraud is that it is a “Western” problem – i.e., that online fraud is a problem only for North America and Western Europe.  In fact, online fraud, in all of its many forms, has long been a global problem, with worldwide consumer and business losses just to e-commerce fraud reaching an estimated $48 billion in 2023.

Both more- and less-affluent countries on multiple continents have experienced an explosive growth in certain types of online fraud.  In the Middle East, for example, a survey by the King Abdul Aziz Center for National Dialogue (as reported in 2022 by the Global Anti-Scam Alliance) found that 62 percent of Saudi Arabian consumers received spam and scam messages, mainly on their mobile devices. Fraudsters impersonated banks in 72 percent of the cases, police in 18 percent of the cases, and delivery services in 10 percent of the cases.  In addition, 14 percent admitted that they fell for the scam and lost money.

Recognizing the frequency of bank-related online fraud schemes, the Kingdom has not only had Public Prosecution pursuing cases against criminals purporting to be bank employees,  but has issued a number of warnings to the public about various online schemes such as domestic labor services, Hajj and Umrah pilgrimages, and other financial fraud schemes.

On September 19, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the Saudi central bank, announced the first edition of the Cyber Anti-Fraud Program (CAFP).  The CAFP, which will run for three months, is directed at training and developing a cohort of trainees, drawn from SAMA and local banks, through intensive cyber fraud education and on-the-field training.  It will incorporate best international standards and practices in the field of cyber fraud training.  It is designed to support national talent within the financial sector, in collaboration with a leading British university and renowned global entities specializing in cyber fraud prevention and detection.

If the CAFP proves successful, it may provide a template for other countries, not just in the Middle East, to enhance their financial sectors’ capabilities to combat online fraud and to better protect banking customers.